

SHANNON BRICK

Program in Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center, New York NY 10016
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SPECIALISATIONS Ethics, Epistemology (especially moral and social)

COMPETENCIES Feminist Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Education

EDUCATION City University of New York, Graduate Center: Ph.D. in Philosophy,
expected May 2022
Dissertation: *Recovering Authenticity*
Committee: Miranda Fricker (chair), Noël Carroll, Iakovos Vasiliou

The University of Melbourne: M.A. in Philosophy, 2015
Thesis: *Sublime Flesh: A Merleau-Pontian Alternative to Deep Ecology*
Supervisor: Andrew Inkpin

Monash University: B.A. Philosophy & Politics, 2013

PUBLICATIONS “Epistemic Neglect” (2020) *Social Epistemology*, 34(5), 490-500.

“Identifying Documentary: Against the Trace Account” (2020) *Film and Philosophy*, 24, 63-83.

“Giving, Receiving, and the Virtue of Testimonial Justice” (2021) *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 10 (6): 46-50. (Invited)

“Obligations of Intellectual Empowerment” (2021) *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 10 (9): 7-13. (Invited)

“Review: Tom Cochrane’s *The Aesthetic Value of the World*.” *The British Journal of Aesthetics*. (Forthcoming)

WORKS IN PROGRESS A paper on moral education and literature. Under revision for resubmission to *British Journal of Aesthetics*

A paper on personal authenticity and moral testimony. Under review at *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*

An empirical paper on our folk concept of gossip. Under review at *Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy*

FUNDING & AWARDS

Charlotte Newcombe Dissertation Completion Fellowship, Institute for Citizens and Scholars, 2021-2022

\$27,500 awarded for “original and significant study of ethical or religious values in all fields of the humanities and social sciences”

Writing Across the Curriculum (WAC) Fellowship, Hunter College, CUNY, 2020-2021

Best Paper Award, Binghamton Philosophy Graduate Conference, 2020

Irene Chayes New Voices Award, American Society of Aesthetics, 2019

\$1,000 award for scholarship in aesthetics that incorporates understanding of barriers faced, in higher education, by persons with marginalized identities.

Winner of Philosophy of Education Essay Competition, Center for Ethics and Education, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2019

\$2,500 awarded for scholarship that uses philosophical insight and argument to address an important issue in educational policy and/or practice

Scholarship recipient, ANU-Princeton-Humboldt Summer Institute on Practical Normativity, Australian National University, 2019

McPherson Fellowship, The Center for Center for Ethics and Education, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2018-2019

Graduate Center Fellowship, CUNY, 2016-2021

\$25,000 per annum

Australian Postgraduate Award, The Australian Research Council, 2014-2015

\$25,000 per annum

GRANTS

Hyptia Diversity Grant, “Towards a Feminist X-Phi,” 2019

Doctoral Student Research Grant, The Graduate Center, 2019

PRESENTATIONS
& CONFERENCE
PARTICIPATION

Comments on Paulina Sliwa, "Moral Inquiry" The Cologne Knowledge Router, Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition, University of Cologne, November 2021

"Show, Don't Tell: A Gricean Account"

North American Association of Philosophy of Education, October 2021

The University of Zurich's Corpus Analysis Workshop, July 2021

"Valuing Art as Valuing a Relationship"

American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, November 2020

"When is Reappropriation Appropriate? Lessons from 'Gossip'" with Tomasz Zyglewicz

Bowling Green State University Graduate Philosophy Conference, November 2020

Binghamton Philosophy Graduate Conference, November 2020

NYC Group for Empirical Approaches to Moral and Social Philosophy, April 2021

"Aesthetic Testimony, Authenticity and Emotion"

European Society of Aesthetics Annual Conference, University of Warsaw, June 2019

American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Phoenix, November 2019

Comments on Hannah Kim's, "Why it Might be True that an Abstract Artifact Smokes a Pipe: A Case for Representational Artifact Theory"

SWIP-Analytic Essay Prize, April 2019

"The Moral-Epistemic Duty of Teachers Amid Political Contestation"

Doctoral Student Workshop on Educational Ethics, Harvard University, May 2020

The American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, September 2019

"Can Pictures Increase Virtue?"

British Society of Aesthetics, Oxford University, September 2017

NYC Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Works, NYU, 2018

“Epistemic Injustice and Childhood Education”

CUNY-Princeton Epistemic Injustice Workshop, CUNY Graduate Center, 2017

TEACHING

Principle Instructor

Literature and Philosophy (PHI 3062): Baruch College, CUNY. Spring 2020

Logic and Moral Reasoning (PHI1100): Baruch College, CUNY. Fall 2019, Spring 2021, Fall 2021

Ethics and Critical Thinking (PHI1600): Baruch College, CUNY. Spring 2019

Philosophy and Gender (PHI 225): Lehman College, CUNY. Spring 2019

Major Issues in Philosophy (PHI1500): Baruch College, CUNY. Fall 2017, Spring 2018, Spring 2021

Problems in Philosophy (PHI171): Lehman College, CUNY. Fall 2018

Teaching Assistant/Tutor

The Big Questions (Peter Singer, Ruth Boeker, Howard Sankey) The University of Melbourne, Semester 1, 2016

Great Thinkers (Ruth Boeker, Christopher Cordner, Andrew Inkpin) The University of Melbourne, Semester 2, 2015

Phenomenology and Existentialism (Andrew Inkpin) The University of Melbourne, Semester 2, 2014

Graduate Course Assistant

Advanced Introduction to Public Health Ethics (Michelle Dyke) New York University, Spring 2022

VISITS

Academic Visitor, Australian National University (ANU), Summer 2019

SERVICE

Organizer, Group for Empirical Approaches to Morality and Society

Co-creator, “Towards a Feminist X-Phi,” 2021

Referee, North American Association for Philosophy of Education, 2021

Referee for *Social Epistemology*, ongoing

Committee Member, Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Graduate Center, CUNY, ongoing

Committee member, Society for Women in Philosophy-Analytic (SWIP-Analytic), 2018-2020

Graduate Council, The Graduate Center, CUNY, 2019-2020

Student Steering Committee, Program in Philosophy, The Graduate Center, CUNY, 2018-2019

Executive Committee of the Program in Philosophy, The Graduate Center, CUNY, 2018-2019

Philosophy Program Hiring Committee, The Graduate Center, CUNY, 2018-2019

Working Group on Inclusive Pedagogy and Tutorial Practice, Philosophy Department, The University of Melbourne, 2015

OUTREACH

Director, Corrupt the Youth NYC, 2021-2022

National Onboarding and Training Committee, Corrupt the Youth, *ongoing*

Corrupt the Youth NYC, 2019-2020

The Philosophy Club, Melbourne, Australia, 2013-2016

REFERENCES

Miranda Fricker, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, CUNY

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Noël Carroll, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, CUNY

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Iakovos Vasiliou, Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, CUNY

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Harry Brighouse, Mildred Fish Harnack Professor of Philosophy and Carol Dickson Bascom Professor of the Humanities, The University of Wisconsin, Madison

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Madison, WI, 53706
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Jesse Prinz, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, CUNY

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New York, NY, 10016
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Eric Mandelbaum, Associate Professor of Philosophy at The Graduate Center, CUNY (teaching reference)

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New York, NY, 10010
646 312-4379

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Suppose you learn that your steak-loving friend has just adopted a vegan diet. You ask her what prompted the change, and she tells you that someone she trusts recently tweeted “Eating meat is immoral.” Your friend’s response is a little disappointing and shallow, but why? Most of our knowledge comes from trusting what other people tell us, so why, in the case of moral matters, does deference seem inappropriate? Some philosophers think it is because moral testimony cannot transmit important epistemic goods, like knowledge or understanding. Others think that when people defer to moral testimony, their actions or characters will be less than fully praiseworthy. While these are important observations, neither provide complete explanations. This dissertation argues that in order to fully understand why moral deference seems inappropriate, we must recruit an ideal that has largely fallen out of favour in contemporary philosophy but which retains great cultural currency: personal authenticity.

I articulate an account of authenticity, which I call the *Rehabilitated Theory of Authenticity*. According to the Rehabilitated Theory, an action is authentic when it is motivated by a reason the agent possesses in virtue of a core class of her cares. In claiming that authenticity is an important component of well-being, I resist some of the prevailing philosophical views about the concept. According to these views, the notion of authenticity rests on antiquated assumptions about the self and licenses objectionably relativistic and, even egotistic, moral thinking. While such worries must be taken seriously, they do not speak to essential aspects of our authenticity concept, as opposed to merely contingent features of the way it has been theorized in the past. The Rehabilitated Theory thus gets its name from the fact that it is responsive to worries directed at earlier incarnations of the idea.

In addition to the problem of moral testimony, the Rehabilitated Theory of Authenticity explains several other puzzling phenomena, including the Puzzle of Aesthetic Testimony (that we seem to need to encounter an artwork ourselves in order to be entitled to beliefs about its aesthetic properties, despite the existence of art critics whose judgements we take to be reliable) and the Cognitive Triviality of Literature (that we often praise literary works for their educative function even though the propositions they communicate are ones we already believe). It also illuminates new connections between types of moral assertion and blame.

Where other philosophers have typically focused on the cognitive goods that forms of testimony and literary speech can transmit, the Rehabilitated Theory of Authenticity brings into focus the sorts of practical reasons they do and do not make available. For instance, while testimony to the effect that “ x is wrong” can transmit propositional knowledge, it cannot transmit the practical reasons constituted by x ’s wrongness – reasons to, for instance, get angry about x . Possession of such reasons, however, is a necessary dimension of caring about x ’s wrongness, and so developing the capacity for authentic moral action.

Beyond implications for moral philosophy, aesthetics and the philosophy of language, the Rehabilitated Theory has implications for how we understand the ethics of influence and persuasion. It thus has relevance to philosophers of education, as well as developmental ethicists and theorists of social change.