Publications
Thinking Functionally About Moral Assertion [Link]
Ethical Theory & Moral Practice. Forthcoming.
Political Philosophy in the AI Ethics Classroom [Link]
Teaching Ethics 24 (2):209-221. 2025.
A CS1 Data Analysis Project with Embedded Ethics (with Shira Wein, Alicia Patterson & Sydney Luken) [Link]
ACM Teaching Materials for Computing (2024)
Deference to Moral Testimony & (In)Authenticity [Link]
Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy: Volume 5. Edited by Josh Knobe and Shaun Nichols. Oxford University Press, 2024.
Show, Don't Tell: Emotion, Acquaintance, & Moral Understanding Through Fiction [Link]
The British Journal of Aesthetics, 63, no. 4 (2023)
Epistemic Neglect [Link]
Social Epistemology. 34 (5). 2020.
Identifying Documentary: Against the Trace Account [Link]
Film & Philosophy. 24:63-83. 2020.
Obligations of Intellectual Empowerment (Invited) [Link]
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (2021)
Giving, Receiving, & the Virtue of Testimonial Justice (Invited) [Link]
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (2021)
José Medina's The Epistemology of Protest (Book review) [Link]
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 34 (1):1-12. 2024.
Tim Cochrane's The Aesthetic Value of the World (Book review) [Link]
The British Journal of Aesthetics 64 (1):139-142. 2023.
Works in progress
Outsourcing Our Practical Reasoning
[Under review]
It seems like there can be something inappropriate about using AI as a decision aid in interpersonal contexts. There is something wrong seeming, for instance, about using AI to draft a reply to your partner’s angry text, or to write your wedding vows. But what, exactly? This paper starts by evaluating two extant explanations. According to the first, outsourcing our reasoning to AI is a violation of duties of agential consideration, where these duties stem from the expressive power of unaided deliberation about what we owe others. According to the second, deference to AI undermines the authenticity of action. Unfortunately, neither of these explanations are fully adequate. The paper defends an alternative explanation, according to which problematic use-cases convey an unwillingness to engage in practical dialogue with the other person, where practical dialogue is a matter of reasoning with another about the shape of the normative landscape. Taking the value of practical dialogue seriously, the following rule-of-thumb is suggested: we ought not to rely on AI to help us navigate interpersonal contexts when the worst, reasonably foreseeable consequence of not doing so, is that we are drawn into practical dialogue
Trust and Automation​
[Under review]​
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​Trust is a powerful attitude, valued not just for enabling us to delegate tasks but also for its power to expand the agency of those we trust. This empowering function is especially significant in education, where teacher trust enables children to gain new skills. As Artificial Intelligence becomes increasingly integrated into classrooms, this paper investigates whether AI systems like smart tutors could extend this kind of trust. Existing accounts suggest that this trust works by transmitting beliefs to students, a mechanism that appears optimistically replicable by AI. The paper argues, however, that this simple account fails, because belief is insufficient to motivate the action necessary for trust to exercise its transformative power. Drawing on the literature that seeks to distinguish trust from mere reliance, the paper defends an alternative view: trust is a reactive attitude, capable of drawing students into a learning community that gives them new reasons for action. Since AI systems are limited to taking the objective attitude, and so cannot take the participant stance required for reactive trust, they are, in principle, incapable of extending this trust.
Biometric Attention-Tracking & Education (with Alicia Patterson)
[Revise & resubmit]
Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence have led to a new wave of optimism about the efficiency-enhancing prospects of educational technology. This paper critically analyses the promise of a nascent form of educational AI, dubbed Biometric Attention-Tracking (BAT) technology. BAT seeks to harness advances in Computer Vision to augment (or replace) a teacher’s capacity to monitor and evaluate student engagement in the classroom. The paper develops three independent lines of criticism. The first line challenges some of the central assumptions about student attention that underpin the current functioning of these systems, so as to demonstrate that these technologies are unlikely to deliver on what is promised of them (at least not any time soon.) The second and third lines of criticism start by imagining that these systems could deliver on their promise of measuring student attention accurately and reliably for all students. It is argued that, even if this were true, we would have strong pro tanto reasons to avoid deploying BAT, because doing so would pose serious risks to several educational goods.
Digital Manipulation & Domination
[In preparation]
The first part of this paper motivates the claim that, when responding to concerns about digital manipulation, we should avoid centering the value of personal autonomy. The second part considers whether republicanism can provide a suitable alternative for illuminating, and substantiating, these concerns. It’s argued that to the extent that they focus on targeted advertising, existing attempts to use republicanism to answer normative questions about digital manipulation face serious limits. Nonetheless, republicanism might still be able illuminate problems with digital manipulation, so long as one focuses on features of the data economy that extend beyond targeted ads.