Shannon Brick

Works in progress

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​​A paper on moral assertion

Revise & resubmit

Abstract:

According to the recently defended E-Functional Account of moral assertion, the practice of making moral assertions persists because moral assertions help their addressees gain moral understanding. Proponents of this view have taken it to support the existence of both an evaluative norm of moral assertion, as well as a prescriptive norm of moral assertion. According to the latter, moral assertions must be accompanied by an explanation. So, for instance, if I am to tell you that eating meat is wrong, I should also tell you why it is wrong. After situating the E-Functional Account in the context of recent work in moral epistemology, this article defends an extant objection to the prescriptive norm that the account is taken to support. A further, deeper objection to the E-Functional Account is then raised. This deeper objection targets the claim the practice of moral assertion persists because it enables addressees to gain moral understanding. This deeper objection is mounted by taking a closer look at a particular sub-class of moral assertions that are dubbed Emotionally Forceful Moral Assertions. It’s argued that while Emotionally Forceful Moral Assertions cannot be explained by their enabling addressees to gain moral understanding, they can be explained by their ability to transmit proleptic reasons and so bring the practical outlook of speaker and hearer into closer alignment. If this is right, it provides strong reason to reject the E-Functional account of moral assertion.

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A paper on digital manipulation
Under review

Abstract: 

The first part of this paper motivates the claim that, when responding to concerns about digital manipulation, we should avoid centering the value of personal autonomy. The second part considers whether republicans can provide a suitable alternative for illuminating, and substantiating, these concerns. It’s argued that to the extent that they focus on targeted advertising, existing attempts to use republicanism to answer normative questions about digital manipulation face serious limits. Nonetheless, republicanism might still be able illuminate problems with digital manipulation, so long as one focuses on features of the data economy that extend beyond targeted ads.

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A paper algorithms & authenticity

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Under review

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Abstract:

Algorithmic Decision Aids (ADAs) are tools that help people make decisions more accurately, more efficiently, or both. The paper distinguishes between two versions of the claim that ADAs threaten personal authenticity. The first version of the worry is that ADAs threaten authenticity because they threaten our ability to put our values into action. An agent committed to fairness, for instance, risks deciding in a way that is unfair when she recruits an ADA, because the ADA is liable to be biased in ways she cannot easily see. On the second version of the worry, opaque ADAs threaten authenticity because they risk undermining the ability of our decisions to express our understanding of our reasons for action. This is a problem, from a normative point of view, because this variety of authenticity is essential for certain relational goods, like friendship, intimacy and (in some cases) a healthy democracy. While both versions of the worry are serious, the paper argues that the first version of the worry is significantly more tractable than the second.